Outraged Citizens: Armed Conflict And Society Evidence From Eastern Congo
Presented by:
Raul Sanchez de la Sierra
Harris School of Public Policy
University of Chicago
Friday, October 29, 2021
12:00 pm-1:15 pm
Taylor-Hibbard Seminar Room (Rm103)
Online - https://go.wisc.edu/esfdvx
We analyze the militias of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, their labor market, and their connections to society, by combining a wide range of historical data for 6,809 individuals with data of 707 episodes of armed group village governance, constructed through historical research in 239 villages. First, we find that the militias, all of whom emerge from rural society and offer little material rewards, account for 94% of rural violent labor, 36% of violent events, half of village control episodes, enjoy significant popular support, and are distinguished from other armed groups in the extent to which they provide security. Second, we show that insecurity in the community drives enrollment into militias, driven by individual nonpecuniary motivation to protect the community, and by social coercion induced by village institutions. Third, we analyze the types of people who join them. Those who join tend to be wealthier, and are more likely to have previously been victimized by foreign-led actors. We show that one such attack on the household creates revenge and protection motivations, whose opportunity cost equal 8 times the yearly p.c. income. The militias are best described as violent social organizations, fueled not so much by incentives for crime as by community demands for revenge and protection, and resembling, in some cases, violent social movements. Our findings suggest that economic explanations, which rely on methodological individualism, paint an incomplete picture of armed conflict.