Shaming, stringency, and shirking:Evidence from food-safety inspections
Agricultural & Applied Economics
Virgina Tech University
Monday, November 21, 2022
12:00 pm-1:15 pm
Taylor-Hibbard Seminar Room (Rm103)
Online - https://go.aae.wisc.edu/livestream
This paper examines the responses of chicken producers to public disclosure of discrete quality in- formation (or categorization) regarding Salmonella in chicken carcasses. I demonstrate that producers exert effort to attain better categorization and shirk when failing to meet the required thresholds. Public disclosure mitigates this shirking effect. However, some producers shirk even under public disclosure when the threshold for disclosure is too stringent. The results suggest that the most effective quality disclosure policies would either disclose continuous (non-categorical) information or impose fines or other sanctions on producers attaining the poorest quality.